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Panel I: KSR v. Teleflex:
The Nonobviousness
Requirement of Patentability
John Richards∗
Herbert F. Schwartz†
Steven J. Lee‡
John R. Thomas§
MR. PAYNE: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My name
is Britton Payne. As the Editor-in-Chief of the Fordham
Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal’s
Volume XVII, I have the honor of opening our 2006 Symposium.
I thank you all for coming and encourage you to attend all three
sessions.
Moderator:
Panelists:

I would like to take a moment to thank our panelists and the
Fordham faculty, particularly Professors Hansen, Katyal, Richards,
and Scafidi, who are participating today, as well as Professor
Reidenberg, our Journal Faculty Moderator. I also thank Helen
Herman, Darin Neely, and the other fine folks in the Office of
Public Programming and Continuing Legal Education for helping
our Journal put this together.
∗

Partner, Ladas & Parry, L.L.P.; Adjunct Professor, Fordham University School of
Law. LL.B. University of London, 1979, M.A., University of Cambridge, 1970, B.A.,
Unversity of Cambridge, 1966.
†
Partner, Ropes & Gray, L.L.P.; Adjunct Professor, New York University School of
Law. LL.B. University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1964, M.A. Applied Economics,
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1964, B.S.E.E., Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, 1957.
‡
Partner, Kenyon & Kenyon, L.L.P. J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 1983,
Ph.D. Organic Chemistry, University of Rochester, 1973, A.B., Chemistry, Cornell
University, 1969.
§
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. LL.M., George Washington
University, J.D., University of Michigan, B.S., Carnegie Mellon University.
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I would like to thank the IPLJ Editorial Board and Staff, many
of whom are here. We are a group of over a hundred Fordham
Law students dedicated to bringing out four excellent books a year
with cutting-edge intellectual property scholarship. You can find
out more about us at http://iplj.net.
Each year our summer book presents the Symposium. We will
start working on this year’s in a few weeks, where many of the
panelists you will see today begin to shape their transcripts into
articles on the forefront of patent, trademark, and copyright law.
We have last year’s summer book outside in the Atrium, if you
would like to see how we do it.
While you are out there, I encourage you to talk with anyone
on the Journal and come downstairs to our office to take a look at
what we are up to. Just take the elevator down to the garden level
and turn right, where we have staffers with all kinds of interesting
backgrounds, recent issues of our Journal, and of course free candy
in the pumpkin.
We are very proud of our publication, and we hope that some
of you in this room will consider us for the next piece that you
decide to publish.
Of all the folks on the Journal, I would like to single out Steve
Zhang, who is in the back there, the IPLJ’s Symposium Editor, for
really putting an outstanding program together with Professor
Hansen. Our Journal is very proud to organize this important
Symposium every year, and Steve is the reason we have such a
great lineup and turnout today. So thank you very much, Steve.
To introduce our program and to welcome us, we are graced by
Dean Moynihan. I want to thank her for her participation and
support so that we can put on a great Symposium every year.
Thank you.
Dean Moynihan.
DEAN MOYNIHAN: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
Hello all and welcome. I welcome you on behalf of Dean William
Treanor, who will be around a little bit later to say hello but simply
could not make it this morning.
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And also, were he here, I know he would want to point out that
he is really proud of the fact that, with our wonderful faculty here
at Fordham, that Fordham is really at the cutting edge of
intellectual property law. He sees the program as a gem at the
School, and it receives his full support.
If he were, again, here, he would―and I would too―like to
thank Professor Hansen for his work on the conference. I know that
Sonia Katyal will be participating a little bit later, as will Susan
Scafidi, who is visiting with us this year. Thanks to our faculty for
your participation and welcome to the members to the panel.
I just want to underline one little message, which is that the
Intellectual Property Law Journal here is―and I am going to use
the word “gem” for a second time―it is a gem of a journal. I
would just ask you, if you are considering writing an article or
submitting an article anywhere, please think of the Journal. It is
widely read and widely recognized.
With no more ado, other than to thank Britton for the work that
he has done as Editor-in-Chief; Gregory Maskel for his work,
which has just been fabulous; and finally, again, I will add, Steven,
you have just done incredible work. And the Dean sends his
regards and thanks.
With that, I think it is going to be an amazing program. Let me
turn it back to Britton so he can move you along. Welcome.
MR. PAYNE: Thank you, Dean Moynihan.
I would like to introduce the moderator for our first panel. Our
panelists will discuss the nonobviousness requirement for obtaining
a patent at issue in the Supreme Court case KSR v. Teleflex1 set to be
decided this term, and implications to the market and patent holders.
Our moderator today will be Mr. John Richards. Mr. Richards
is a partner at Ladas & Parry and an Adjunct Professor here at
Fordham, where he teaches U.S. and international patent law. Mr.
Richards joined Ladas & Parry in 1973 and became partner in
1

Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 Fed. Appx. 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 2965 (June 26, 2006) (No. 04-1350). As this publication went to press, the
Supreme Court handed down its decision. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 2007 WL
1237837 (U.S. Apr. 30, 2007).
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1982. He is the General Editor of The Legal Aspects of
Introducing Products to the United States and co-author of
Intellectual Property and the Internal Market of the European
Community.
Please join me in welcoming Professor Richards.
PROFESSOR RICHARDS: Thank you.
The topic which we have this morning is the third limb of what
is required for patentability. Something has to be new, it has to be
useful, and that has been in the statute here since 1790.2 And now
it also has not to be obvious.
The idea that something should require something beyond the
original 1790 requirements evolved during the 19th century and
was articulated very clearly by the Supreme Court in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood3 in the 1850s, but it did not find its way into the patent
statute until 1952.4 We have some philosophical issues as to what
the purpose of this requirement is.
I am going to give a paper in a second, which is an
international comparative view.
We have over the course of history perhaps two different ways
of approaching what the purpose of this additional requirement is.
One is to say that a patent should not take from the public
something which it would naturally want to do developed from
what is already in the prior art. The other is a much more
subjective approach, which is that you should not get a patent
unless you’ve got something truly extraordinary; you’ve got to
have some additional level of inventivity and creativity in order to
justify the right to give somebody an exclusive right to use an
invention for the period of term, which is now provided at twenty
years from the filing day,5 traditionally seventeen years from grant
in the United States.6 So we’ve got these two aspects of the reason
for the requirement that, in addition to something being new and
useful, it must also not be obvious.
2
3
4
5
6

Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (Apr. 10, 1790).
52 U.S. 248 (1851).
Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (1952).
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
Id. § 154(c)(1)
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The Supreme Court in the 1940s said that you needed to have
this inventive creativity genius, the “flash of creative genius” test.7
This was modified in 1952 by the statute, which for the first time
added the requirement for nonobviousness into the statute and said
that it does not matter how the invention is made; you need an
objective standard.8
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue on a number of
occasions, and the gentleman to my left will deal with those
Supreme Court decisions. Some Supreme Court decisions back in
the 1970s set a fairly high standard for nonobviousness.
The Federal Circuit has adopted its own test. The Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals takes all patent cases at the appellate
level in the United States. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
has adopted the so-called “motivation test,” which says that
something is obvious if the prior art motivates you to do it.
There have been criticisms, particularly from what I call the
new computer industries, the new patent industries, the IT area,
which have come relatively recently into the patent system, that
this standard is too low and that it is allowing patents to be granted
in situations where it is not in the public interest for these patents
to be granted.
This has led to the case now going up again to the Supreme
Court in the KSR case. We have on the panel here Jay Thomas,
who has written a brief on behalf of law professors on this issue;9
we’ve got Herb Schwartz with Ropes & Gray, who has studied
these briefs in some detail; and Steve Lee from Kenyon & Kenyon,
who is very active in this area, to give us their presentations on
these issues.
That is about all I want to say by way of opening.
My own paper this morning is to try to put this into an
international context and see whether we can learn anything―and
7

Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (1952).
9
Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), available at
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/14_IP_profs.pdf [hereinafter Law
Professors’ Brief].
8

PANEL_I_FINAL_050807

880

5/8/2007 12:57:03 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

Vol. 17:875

I am not sure we can learn anything―from what other countries
have done on this topic.
As I said in opening, the U.S. Supreme Court in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood said, “unless more ingenuity and skill [is applied to the
new invention] . . . than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic
acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree
of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every
invention.”10 That Supreme Court case referred back to an English
case,11 Losh v. Hague in the 1830s, where it was said that “you
cannot have a patent for applying a well known thing which might
be applied to 50,000 different purposes, for applying it to an
operation which is exactly analogous to what was done before.”12
So acknowledging back even in the 1830s that the practice had
been to impose something extra beyond novelty and usefulness
both in England and in the United States.
The word “obvious” comes from the Latin ob via, meaning “in
the road.” This was pointed out comparatively recently in an
English case, a Philips application, where the court basically said
that one of the tests which it was going to apply for obviousness in
England was whether what was now being claimed in the patent
was something which “lay in the road” of those who were
developing the art.13
The word “obviousness,” though, appearing in the first English
decisions to deal with this were not until the 1880s and 1890s. Up
to that point, the courts had basically said that “we are not going to
grant a patent if it lacks inventive subject matter.” So in the very
odd cases you see this reference to subject matter or lack of subject
matter as being the test.
But in Thomson v. American Braided Wire, the House of Lords
said: “[T]he mode in which the tube of braided wire is made
available as a bustle”―this was basically taking wire and screwing
it up and making a bustle for ladies’ skirts―“by the use of clamps
10

52 U.S. 248, 267 (1851).
Id. at 261.
12
1 Webster’s Pat. Cas. 202, 208 (1838), available at http://books.google.com/books?
vid=0VUqoE_lIYtwIZzw&id=M3QDAAAAQAAJ.
13
Philips (Bogsra’s) Application, [1974] R.P.C. 241, 251 (Pat. Appeal Trib. 1970)
(U.K.).
11
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applied and fixed in the manner described, appears . . . to be simple
and efficient, and not so obvious as to occur to everyone
contemplating the use of braided wire for the purpose of a
bustle.”14 So here, for the first time in English case law, we have
the word “obvious” appearing.
The question is whether it is something which is obvious to
everyone contemplating the use of braided wire for the purposes of
a bustle. That was a fairly narrow exception they are making there.
They are saying that making use of wire for a bustle, obvious
maybe; but you’ve got to look to see who it is that is doing it and
what standard you are going to apply to move from what everyone
might want to do to something special, which is subject matter of
patentability.
That sort of developed through until, in 1932, the English
statute put in a specific requirement that something should not be
obvious and should have “an inventive step having regard to what
was known or used prior to the date of the patent” in order to be
patentable.15
In Germany, the Imperial Patent Act of 1877,16 which was the
first German patent statute, again basically used a new and useful
definition of what was patentable. But the Germans added in two
additional requirements in their case law. In Germany, even
though they are a civil law country, case law is still important.
They added in a requirement for “inventivity,” and they also
required that there be “a technical advance in the art” in order for
something to be patentable.17 So we had a double requirement
there.
In France, we did not get the situation of having a requirement
for something not to be obvious put into the statute until 1968,18
very recently. But the test there was if it was “a trivial
14

Thomson v. American Braided Wire, [1889] 6 R.P.C. 518, 528 (H.L.) (U.K.).
Patents and Designs Act, 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 32 (Eng.).
16
Patentgesetz [Patent Act], May 25, 1877, RGBl. I at 501 (F.R.G.).
17
See F.K. Beier, The Inventive Step in its Historical Development, 17 INT’L REV.
INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 301, 317 (1986).
18
Law No. 68-1 of Jan. 2, 1968, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.]
[Official Gazette of France], Jan. 3, 1968, p. 13, translated in 67 PAT. & TRADE MARK
REV. 100, 100–09, 128–36 (1969).
15
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modification of the prior art”―whatever “trivial” means―the
French courts would typically say that this was not new. They
basically expanded the definition of something being new to cover
trivial modifications of the prior art.
The Japanese statute provides that something should not be
patentable if it is easily made by those skilled in the art.19
So that is the sort of general background.
Now, what sort of tests are being applied around the world in
order to determine whether something is or is not obvious?
The European Patent Office is a good place to start. I think a
lot of people know that in all the literature we talk about a
“problem and solution” approach to obviousness in the European
Patent Office. This comes to some extent out of German thinking.
I have spoken to various people over the years, and, reading the
case law, I think that is probably a misnomer as to what really is
being required.
I think what we have is a “task and
accomplishment” test rather than a “problem and solution” test.
What the case law of the European Patent Office says is that
you have to be objective in determining the obviousness or
inventive step required,20 and that in order to do this, to quote from
the COMVIK case21―I did put it in a paper, but I do not think it
made it into yours―“For the purpose of the problem-and-solution
approach, the problem must be a technical problem, it must
actually be solved by the solution claimed, all the features of the
claim should contribute to the solution, and the problem must be
one that the skilled person in the particular technical field might be
asked to solve at the priority date. . . . If no technical problem can
be derived from the application, then an invention within the
meaning of Article 52 EPC does not exist.”22

19

See Patent Act, Act No. 121 of 1959, art. 29(2), translated in http://www.cas.go.jp/
jp/seisaku/hourei/data/PA.pdf.
20
See Case T 0024/81, BASF, 1983 O.J. E.P.O. 133 (Technical Bd. of Appeal 1982),
available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/t810024ep1.htm.
21
Case T 0641/00, COMVIK GSM AB v. DeTeMobile Deutsche Telekom MobileNet
GmbH (Technical Bd. of Appeal Sep. 26, 2002), available at http://legal.europeanpatent-office.org/dg3/pdf/t000641ep1.pdf.
22
Id. para. 5.
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Then, in assessing whether this invention exists, you look first
to see what is the closest piece of prior art; then you look to see
what is the gap between that closest piece of prior art and the
claimed invention; and then you look to see whether there is a
technical problem there; and, if there is a technical problem,
whether other prior art, the closest piece of prior art, will enable
you to bridge that gap easily.23
It is an artificial test, because you have to determine what is the
closest piece of prior art, which is not the ideal way of dealing with
the situation. The closest piece of prior art is defined by the case
law as being something which is the closest thing to try to solve
the same problem.24
So you can find situations in the European Patent Office where
what is regarded as being the closest piece of prior art for purposes
of determining novelty is not regarded as being the closest piece of
prior art for determining inventive step or nonobviousness, which
in itself can be somewhat confusing at times.
The case law does deal, as is required here, with who is the
person skilled in the art. Now, it is a common theme, I think, now
throughout pretty well all jurisdictions that this person skilled in
the art is a totally hypothetical person and could in the appropriate
circumstances be a melding of more than one person. It can be
regarded as being a team of people putting stuff together to achieve
the desired degree of knowledge. Again, the test is that this person
should be skilled in the art but not inventive.25 So basically it is
the ordinary, run-of-the-mill worker or team or workers in the
particular field.
The case law in the European Patent Office addresses one of
the tests which is commonly looked at throughout the world as to
23

See Case T 0159/95, Sumitomo Chem. Co., Ltd. v. Bayer AG (Technical Bd. of
Appeal Apr. 19, 2000), available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/
t950159eu1.pdf.
24
See Case T 1203/97, Recup Svenska AB v. Recotech Heatex AB (Technical Bd. of
Appeal May 9, 2000), available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/
t971203eu1.pdf.
25
See Case T 0039/93, SNF Floerger v. Allied Colloids Ltd., [1993] O.J. E.P.O. 134
(Technical Bd. of Appeal 1996), available at http://legal.european-patentoffice.org/dg3/pdf/t930039ex1.pdf.
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whether it is appropriate to say something is obvious just because
somebody could have produced the required invention. The case
law says: No, that is not the test; there has got to be something
which would show that the skilled person would based on the prior
art have produced the claimed invention―the “could, would, and
sometimes should” inquiry.26
The European Patent Office accepts that if you have
unexpected results from carrying out your invention, then these
unexpected results are themselves indicative of it not being
obvious, that there is an inventive step involved.27 The European
Patent Office has specifically taken the same view as the Federal
Circuit has taken here on the question of whether something can be
regarded as being obvious, and therefore not patentable, simply
because it was obvious to try it. The case law in the European
Patent Office says that something is not patentable simply because
it is obvious to try, unless the person who is doing that trying has a
reasonable expectation of success in carrying out that testing.28
Helpful factors which the case law added are there is a
prejudice against doing what was claimed, there has been a longfelt need for the invention, that there has been commercial success,
evidence that the invention was regarded as being a technical
breakthrough, and that as a practical matter the invention leads to
simplification―and so-called “objective factors” developed in this
country following one of the Supreme Court cases which I
mentioned earlier, the case of Graham v. Deere, where the
Supreme Court said: first of all, you do an analysis to see whether
the thing is prima facie obvious; and then you can look at what
26

Case T 0253/85, AKZO/Dry jet-wet spinning, [1987] 4 E.P.O.R. 198 (Technical Bd.
of Appeal 1987), available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/
t850253eu1.htm.
27
See Case T 0223/84, Extraction of Uranium/Albright & Wilson, [1986] E.P.O.R. 66,
73 (Technical Bd. of Appeal 1985); Case T 0002/83, Simethicone Tablet/Rider, [1984]
O.J. E.P.O. 265 (Technical Bd. of Appeal 1984), available at http://legal.europeanpatent-office.org/dg3/biblio/t830002ep1.htm; cf. Case T 0021/81, Electromagnetically
Operated Switch/Allen-Bradley, [1983] O.J. E.P.O. 265 (Technical Bd. of Appeal 1982),
available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/t810021ex1.htm.
28
Case T 0253/85, AKZO/Dry jet-wet spinning, [1987] 4 E.P.O.R. 198 (Technical Bd.
of Appeal 1987), available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/
t850253eu1.htm.
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they called the “secondary considerations”―the Federal Circuit
now calls them “objective factors”―to see what the real world
thought of the invention.29 A similar approach in the European
Patent Office.30
So the big difference in the European Patent Office is this
problem or task and solution or achievement or accomplishment
test.
In England, the patent law has been harmonized with the
European Patent Convention. The statutory language dealing with
obviousness in England31 is the same as the European Patent
Convention.32 That has not deterred the English courts from taking
a rather different approach.
The leading case is a case called Windsurfing International v.
Tabur Marine, where the Court of Appeal―and this has been
followed generally―said there are four steps to be taken: first, to
identify the inventive concept; secondly, “to assume the mantle of
the normally skilled but unimaginative addressee” and to impute to
him “the common general knowledge of the art”; then, to identify
the differences between that and the invention; and finally, to ask
whether it is obvious or not.33
So here, rather than looking to see what is the closest piece of
prior art, as is required by the European Patent Office, in its
assessment of inventiveness the British courts look to see whether
something is part of the common general knowledge. So you’ve
got one particular piece of prior art, which you cite as your primary
reference, and then you look to see whether the common general
knowledge covers the gap between that and what is being claimed;
and, if it does not, then probably the case will be held not to be
obvious.
29

383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
See Case T 0106/84, Packing Maching/Michaelsen, [1985] O.J. E.P.O. 132
(Technical Bd. of Appeal 1985), available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/
biblio/t840106ep1.htm.
31
Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 3 (Eng.).
32
Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention—EPC),
art. 56, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199.
33
Windsurfing Int’l Inc. v. Tabur Marine (Great Britain) Ltd., [1985] R.P.C. 59, 73–74
(C.A. (Civ.) 1984).
30
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However, the English courts have also adopted a somewhat
different view on whether something is obvious to try makes it
unpatentable. So there is case law in England which says that if,
having looked at the common general knowledge, one skilled in
the art would think that the expedient in question was worth a try,
then that makes it obvious.34
The German approach focuses very heavily on the technical
content of what is being claimed, and still in reality harks back to
something which has been taken out of the German statute―since
the German statute, like the English statute, now reads exactly the
same as the European Patent Convention requires―to that old
German requirement of “a step forward in the art.”35 So in
Germany the evidence of unexpected results or superiority is still
regarded as being a significant feature in terms of whether
something is regarded as being obvious or not.
When Japan adopted its patent statute, it was modeled on the
German statute. They never put into the Japanese statute a specific
requirement for technical advance, but nevertheless there is the
concept of koko [phonetic] in the Japanese assessment. Even
today, it is much easier to persuade a Japanese examiner that
something is patentable if you can show an advantage. Don’t get
too much into this question of motivation, which is the test in the
United States; don’t get too much into a “problem and solution”
approach. The test is: could one skilled in the art easily have made
it; and then, in applying that test, look to the experimental results
that you can produce, the advantages that you can set out; and, if
you’ve got good advantages over the prior art, then that goes an
enormous way in practice to establishing patentability.36
So we have a number of different tests which are being applied
around the world, in some cases different tests being applied based
on exactly the same statutory language. I am not sure what this
34

Hallen v. Brabantia, [1991] R.P.C. 195, 213 (C.A. (Civ.) 1990).
West German Patent Act (Patentgesetz), Dec. 16, 1980, BGBl. I, at 1, §§ 1(1), 4,
available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/en/de/de081en.html# (with 1998
amendments).
36
Examination Guidelines for Patent & Utility Model, Japanese Patent Office, Part II,
Ch. 2, § 2.4, available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/t_tokkyo_e/Guidelines/PartII2.pdf.
35
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really does to help us come to a conclusion as to what the law
ought to be, because all of them have advantages under some
circumstances and disadvantages under others. The only thing
which is common to all of them is that they are essentially
objective standards and that they focus much more on what the
usefulness of the invention is to the public and whether the public
would naturally have been led to those inventions than they do to
the question of whether there has been some sort of extraordinary
mental leap of ingenuity in coming up with the invention.
So that is my paper.
The next speaker is Herb Schwartz of Ropes & Gray, probably
today the senior patent litigator in the City in terms of experience
and wisdom. I am sure he is got some very interesting insights on
what is going on in KSR, the case which is actually before the
Supreme Court. Herb.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I guess I am senior because I am probably
the oldest at the moment.
MR. RICHARDS: That is not what I meant.
MR. SCHWARTZ: Probably the last of a dying breed.
In any event, it was more than fifty years ago that the
Congress―and really Judge Giles Rich essentially, who drafted
it―came up with the language that people are struggling over in
the 1952 Act.37 It is worth having in mind exactly what those
words are.
They say, in particular, that something cannot be patented if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and
the prior art are such that “the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains.”38 Pretty simple paragraph really, pretty simple words.
Although the claim has been made that it was really codifying
prior law, certainly that construct, I think, was new in the exact
way it was written.

37
38

Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952).
35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
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Various lower courts struggled with it. Then, in 1966, the
Supreme Court explained in Graham v. Deere39 how you go about
applying that test. That really was fairly straightforward. Namely,
in Graham the Supreme Court basically said that, under § 103, you
have to look at the scope and content of the prior art, you have to
determine the differences, you have to determine the level of
ordinary skill in the art, and then against that background
obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is to be
determined.40
Then, the Court talks about what it called
“secondary” considerations that could also be considered.41
So there we have basically, as far as I am concerned, the
statutory groundwork and the Supreme Court interpretation of how
it is supposed to be done.
After Graham, there were a couple of other Supreme Court
cases, which different people say do different things, which are the
Sakraida42 and the Anderson’s-Black Rock43 cases. In my view, I
do not think they changed the basic Graham construct. I think the
Graham construct is what it is, and I do not think that those cases
put a requirement of synergism in the law. There is a lot of
argument in various amici briefs as to what they do, but my view is
that it does not change very much.
Then you come along to 1982 and you have the Federal Circuit
writing its own view. The Federal Circuit, after having looked at
the statute, after having looked at Graham, then came up with its
own gloss on that test. The Federal Circuit’s gloss―it is probably
worthwhile stating exactly what they said―is that you needed to
look at whether or not there is “some teaching, suggestion or
motivation to combine the references,”44 and in looking at that you
have to consider the “knowledge of those skilled in the art.”45 To
me that is really the key to it. The key to it is: What do you have
to learn about from the knowledge of the person ordinarily skilled
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
Id. at 13–15.
Id. at 17.
Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
Pro-Mold v. Great Lakes Plastics, 75 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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in the art in terms of determining whether something is
nonobvious?
The reason that the Federal Circuit said it did what it did was to
avoid hindsight; namely, to avoid the notion that after the fact if
you have A and you have B and someone looks at the combination
C, anybody can say that would have been easy to do. Therefore, to
avoid hindsight, what you want to do is see if you can get a full
exposition of what the person of ordinary skill in the art knew and
as to whether or not that hypothetical person―I agree with John it
is a hypothetical person―would have had either some motivation,
some teaching, or suggestion, to combine the references in the way
that the inventor combined. To me that is the basic Federal Circuit
concept.
That rocked along for many years.
What happened,
interestingly enough, is now that the Supreme Court has decided to
get involved in patent matters, as we have seen in the last three
years, suddenly, after turning down maybe―I don’t know; John
would probably know more than I―probably a hundred cert.
petitions directed to this, all of a sudden in 2005 and 2006 we now
find this KSR case up to the Court. To discuss “why now?”―I am
not going to do that because I do not know why now―but,
interestingly enough, that is what happened.
This produced a flurry of paper. You have before the day is
done something like thirty or forty amicus briefs on both sides of
the question, piled high, arguing all sorts of things. The question
to me is: What does it all mean and what are people really saying?
I would like to just give a few thoughts on what I think people are
saying.
If you go through the briefs, in my view, you find attempts to
reformulate a test. I think they are all very lacking. To me, you
first go to the petition in KSR.46 When all is said and done, they
say the law ought to be changed, that you have to have the
capability “of adapting extant technology to achieve a desired
result.”47 In other words, what they are looking to do is to make a
46

Brief for Petitioner, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22,
2006), available at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/8_2D22_2D06KSRMeritsBrief.pdf.
47
Id. at 16.
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much tougher and higher standard; namely, it is a test that you
actually have to be capable of adapting it before you can get a
patent. To me, that is fairly far out, and that is ultimately what the
petitioner is saying. To me, it is not a very workable nor a sensible
standard. And, more importantly, it does not come out of the
statute; it just comes out of the imagination of the attorneys.
Then you get the Solicitor General weighing in, who thinks he
will have an even tougher theory. He comes up with the notion of
there needs to be an “extraordinary level of innovation” before you
get a patent.48 This is really an attempt to one-up Justice Douglas,
who had “flash of creative genius.”49 The Solicitor says, “Now we
will go beyond that; we will look for extraordinary level of
innovation.”50 I think that is a little bit even further out than where
the petitioner is.
The only tempering thought, ultimately, in the briefs―I
discount most of the interested parties, like companies and patent
bar associations―is there are two sets of law professors, one set on
each side of it, which I think is very interesting. You have the law
professors on the side of―
MR. THOMAS: On the side of good.
MR. SCHWARTZ: That is the Jay Thomas side.
The law professors on the side of KSR say, and I quote, that
what they want is a test of the “difference between the new thing
and what was known before not considered sufficiently great to
warrant a patent.”51 This to me is somewhat of an attempt to cut a
middle ground between Justice Douglas and what the statute says,
and I think it ought to get rejected for the same reason as the first
two. It is not what the statute says and it is not what the test is. I
am sorry, John, but that is where your group of law professors is.
Then you have IBM, who decides that they are going to put in
a petition in support of neither side. They come up with what they
48
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, KSR Int’l
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), available at http://www.patent
lyo.com/patent/SG.pdf [hereinafter Solicitor General’s Brief].
49
Cuno Eng’g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
50
Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 48, at 10.
51
Law Professors’ Brief, supra note 9, at 27.
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call a rebuttable presumption of “teaching, suggestion, or
motivation.”52 Again, this is sort of very imaginative. To me,
there is absolutely no basis whatsoever for it in the statute and I do
not think that the Court is going to pay much attention to it. Again,
it is an attempt really to undercut patentability and to undercut
§ 103.
Then you come down to: Well, what is going to support where
the law is now, if anything? I will just really talk briefly about
only two things.
First, what does the respondent say, which is the person who is
trying to support it? His position is that teaching, suggestion, and
what have you, it is fully consistent with the statute and with the
three prior cases. He does not really tell you a lot about why that is
so, but that is what he would like you to believe.
There is a law professors’ brief which I think is a little more
interesting and helpful.53 This is a different group of law
professors, although one professor, Mark Lemley, who is a really
smart guy, has been on both sides, first the petitioner and now the
respondent, so he cannot lose. I guess he was in the petition
originally in support of it, then he changed sides, and now he is in
the law professors’ brief in support of the patent.
What they say ultimately is that the TSM test “introduces at
least some predictability into the nonobviousness inquiry.”54 Their
point, which is to me an interesting point, is that it is not the be-all
and end-all, but it does give you some help in trying to understand
nonobviousness beyond what the traditional Graham factors
provide.
The other thing they say on top of that is if you look at the
results of litigation in the Federal Circuit, it is relatively even in the
amount of reversals. Now, I do not make anything of that, frankly.
52

Brief for International Business Machines Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Neither Party at 6, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2006),
available at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/IBM.pdf [hereinafter IBM Brief].
53
Brief of Business and Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Respondents, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2006), available
at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/204111_A_20M_20brief.pdf [hereinafter Law &
Business Professors’ Brief].
54
Law & Business Professors’ Brief, supra note 53, at 27.
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I do not know how you can say that if the Federal Circuit has been
reversing things 40 percent of the time and they have not changed
over the last twenty years, that somehow tells you that the test
makes sense. But in any event, that is what the argument is of that
part of the law professors’ brief. They cite their own articles,
which all good law professors do. I do not know if John does that,
but that is what they do. That is the law professors’ argument.
As I say, I think the statistical one does not do it. The other
one I think is more interesting.
Then, after all of that, what will the Court do? I do not know
what the Court will do, but I just have one or two thoughts as to
what they might do in this sense.
I think probably it is instructive to look at what happened in the
most recent case like this, in the case involving injunctive relief.55
There, after having listened to arguments about as diverse as we
have here on obviousness, the Court ultimately came back to the
notion that there was a test of a hundred years ago, the test made
some sense, the four-part test; the problem was that the Court had
not been doing a good enough job in applying it and they ought to
go back and apply it properly.56 I would suggest that we will
probably see something like that come out of the Supreme Court
this time. We have a statute, we have Graham, we have some I
would say over-zealous comments by the Federal Circuit.
Now, since the case has been taken on cert., the Federal Circuit
has been writing opinions to try to influence the Court to cut back.
I think when the day is done the Supreme Court will go back to
basics, they will go back to the statute, they will go back to
Graham, and they will say, “Okay, guys, let’s now go back and
let’s apply this in the way that the statute says and we really
meant.” Who knows? That is my take on where this will end up.
Thank you.
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, Herb.
Our next speaker is Steven Lee from another major IP firm in
the City, Kenyon & Kenyon. Steve is involved in chemical and
55
56

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
Id. at 1840–41.
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pharmaceutical matters for the most part, a traditional patent
industry. So, notwithstanding what I said about a lot of the issues
coming up from the IT end, I think he’s got a somewhat different
perspective from the traditional patent industry point of view.
Steve.
[See article below in lieu of presentation transcript.]57
MR. RICHARDS: Professor Thomas is a full-time academic at
Georgetown University. He is a good friend of Fordham. He has
been to many of the conferences here. I think we know him well.
He has always got something interesting to say.
PROFESSOR THOMAS: Thanks a lot. That was a little
ambiguous there at the end, but I do appreciate the intro. It is
always a pleasure to be here in the amphitheater that is really a
theater―Hugh, you’ve got to work on that description. I am very
pleased to be here with these three panelists. It will be a tough act
to follow, but I will do my best.
KSR is a big case because it addresses the only significant
patentability requirement that exists under U.S. law. I count four
fundamental patentability requirements: statutory subject matter,58
utility,59 novelty,60 and nonobviousness.61 It is plain that in the
United States statutory subject matter is as broad as human
experience itself. Utility, a very lenient requirement, is also easily
met in most areas of technology. Novelty too is also easily
satisfied. So what we are really left with is the fundamental
gatekeeper to patentability. Should the Supreme Court raise that
standard, it will effectively cede a great deal of proprietary subject
matter into the public domain. So KSR potentially affects every
pending patent challenge, every application at the Patent Office,
and basically every proceeding everywhere involving patent rights.
Let me begin by building upon what my two predecessor
speakers said with respect to the Federal Circuit. Since certiorari
57

Steven J. Lee & Jeffrey M. Butler, Teaching, Suggestion and Motivation: KSR v.
Teleflex and the Chemical Arts, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 915
(2007).
58
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
59
Id.
60
Id. § 102.
61
Id. § 103.
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was granted in KSR, the court of appeals has been fighting a
rearguard battle. It has issued a number of opinions―DyStar62
plainly the most significant, but not the only one attempting to
defend this motivation requirement.
In these opinions the Federal Circuit has stressed the increased
flexibility of the motivation requirement; it stated that the
motivation requirement forms part of one of the Graham factors,
the level of ordinary skill in the art,63 it has said that the motivation
requirement flows from the Administrative Procedure Act,64 and it
has opined that the motivation requirement serves congressional
goals in enacting § 103 of the Patent Act in the first place.65 So
numerous worthy predecessors have suddenly been identified.
The trouble with these post-hoc rationales is that this increased
flexibility which the court now harps upon tends to make the
motivation requirement superfluous. One advantage of the
motivation requirement is that it makes obviousness
determinations easier to carry out. Patent Office examiners need
no longer weigh their experience and expertise when evaluating
individual inventions. Rather, they simply become bibliographers
who piece together references under the assumption that persons of
skill in the art are dullards who require essentially a connect-thedots explanation in order to do anything, even perhaps tie their
shoes. So to the extent that the motivation standard becomes more
flexible, its primary advantage is lost.
Further, the Court of Appeals has stated that the motivation to
combine can come from the nature of the problem to be solved or
from the level of skill in the art itself. Those standards seem very
nebulous. Finally, to the extent that the motivation requirement
simply restates the Graham framework, it amounts to an
unnecessary verbal flourish that ought to be rejected.

62

Dystar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. Deutschland KG v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d
1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
63
Dystar, 464 F.3d at 1370.
64
Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
65
In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
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What should the Supreme Court do as it weighs the merits of
the KSR case? I will speak to five policy goals I hope the Court
will keep in mind.
First, a heightened level of obviousness does not necessarily
evidence an anti-patent bias. Inside the Beltway, most patent
practitioners are in the business of procuring patents. In the view
of many of these patent solicitors, the more patents, the better.
This view may not appropriately account for the dynamism of
innovation. If the patent system has a higher level of obviousness,
in theory it will encourage higher levels of innovation. Potential
innovators will know they have to achieve a certain degree of
inventiveness in order to be eligible to enter the patent game.
Also, consider a somewhat simplified world where inventors
may be classified as either primary innovators or follow-on
innovators. If the level of obviousness is low, everybody gets a
patent. The result is that the primary innovator has to share his
success with follow-on innovators who produce marginal
improvements upon his product, essentially through crosslicensing of patents. If the level of the obviousness is raised, then
only the primary innovator obtains patent-based rewards. Again,
through a more stringent obviousness standard, we might promote
higher and better levels of innovation.
Second, I hope the Court will articulate obviousness policy
better than it did in Graham v. John Deere. Recall that in Graham
v. John Deere the Court said that the goal of the patent system is to
figure out the things that “are worth to the public the
embarrassment of an exclusive patent,” quoting Jefferson.66
“Worth” is a mischievous word. There are a lot of things that have
worth to society, but are nonetheless not patentable inventions
because they are not sufficiently innovative. A “worth”-based
policy goal just seems to be wrongheaded.
The Graham Court also stated that the patent system should
weed out those inventions that would be developed due to ordinary
competitive processes, absent a patent system, from those
inventions that would be developed only due to the lure of the
66

383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
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patent system. That seems to be the right policy, but the Court
does not go much further in telling us how to achieve that
aspiration.
Third, I think we need to think hard about a very difficult
question: When do we have obviousness right? What is the
appropriate standard of obviousness or nonobviousness; how do
we even go about deciding that? There may not be one answer;
rather, different answers may be appropriate for distinct industries.
The Court may also wish to recall the two sorts of statistical
error, Type I and Type II errors.67 Of course we wish to craft an
obviousness standard that leads to as few errors as possible. But,
knowing that some errors are inevitable, what we ought to do is
categorize the errors into two sorts. Sometimes we will grant
patents improvidently, so patents should not have issued because
the claimed invention would have been obvious. Yet we
mistakenly allowed the patent anyway; that is one sort of mistake.
The other type of error is that the invention should have been
patented, but, because we misapplied the obviousness standard, a
patent did not issue. Right now I would say we virtually have only
the first sort of error in the patent system. There are very few
instances where we have the second type; that is to say, we should
have issued a patent but we did not get one out. So I think we need
to think of a formulation where, to the extent we have errors, they
are balanced. This framework, would, I think, provide the best
chance of both preserving the public domain but also promoting
innovation.
Fourth, the Supreme Court ought to think carefully about
whether additional verbal formulations are necessary or even
desirable. Is this an area where we need a lot of subtests and
further development by the Court? Does the Court need to speak
out and further refine Graham; or should we just leave the
determination to the statutory language and the previously
articulated Graham factors? Do we need further expressions from
on high about how to conduct obviousness determinations? Or is
this standard, because of different industry profiles, different paces
67
See, e.g., Erik S. Maurer, An Economic Justification for a Broad Interpretation of
Patentable Subject Matter, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1094 (2001).
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of innovation, and different technological features, one that is
simply incapable of meaningful articulation in some sweeping
manner?
Finally, I hope the Court will think more about the person of
ordinary skill in the art. Right now the motivation test blunts the
expertise of Patent Office examiners because they are not allowed
to rely upon it. They simply act like librarians, putting references
together and connecting the dots. Looking toward the Federal
Circuit opinions, the level of ordinary skill in the art is indeed one
of the Graham factors.68 But, in fact, it is not an error for lower
courts not to identify the level of ordinary skill in the art. The
Federal Circuit will nonetheless affirm district court obviousness
decisions, even though that Graham finding has not been expressly
made.69
Even at the Federal Circuit level, the person of ordinary skill in
the art typically acts as no more than a bland and nondescript
doppelganger for the judge.
Federal Circuit opinions not
uncommonly identify the level of ordinary skill, as, for example,
“a Ph.D. in X field with two years of experience”—and that’s it;
there is no further refinement or development of the significance of
these facts. This finding is nothing more than a placeholder.
Nothing further is said about the person of ordinary skill in the art.
I think that is a problem.
Looking back to the case law that issued before the motivation
requirement became entrenched, the Federal Circuit had begun a
more robust inquiry into exactly who this person of ordinary skill
in the art was―what were the tools that she used in the field; what
kinds of experiments did she perform; what sorts of problems had
she in the recent past traversed; what are the artisanal and craft
skills that persons of ordinary skill in the art possess? Early in its
history, the Federal Circuit had pursued this manner of inquiry, but
it ultimately replaced such review with a very blunt and overly

68

383 U.S. at 16.
See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 963 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158, 163 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
69
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lenient test. I should hope that the Supreme Court might
encourage us to go back along that path not taken.
Now, what is the Supreme Court going to do in this case?
There are a lot of options.
The Court could return to a synergy requirement. I suppose I
read Anderson’s-Black Rock70 and Sakraida71 a little more
generously than Mr. Schwartz. So I could certainly see the
Supreme Court returning to a synergy requirement. I hope that is
not what happens. Such an outcome would, indeed, work a broadscale transfer of proprietary rights into the public.
Second, the Court could stipulate that the “teaching,
suggestion, motivation” requirement serves the pinnacle of
obviousness. But it would no longer serve as a requirement.
Certainly, where the prior art lays out in a step-by-step manner
how to perform the claimed invention, well of course the invention
would have been obvious. But we also need to acknowledge the
problem-solving skills that are inherent to a person of ordinary
skill. So the “teaching, suggestion, motivation” test might be the
start of the inquiry, but it would not be the finish.
Finally―and I think I have to say at this point what I think
might well happen―is that the Supreme Court might issue a Pfafflike restatement of the law that does not really accomplish much.72
You may remember the Pfaff case, which involved § 102(b) onsale bar case. No one really knows why the Court granted
certiorari in that case. There was a standard that was working
fairly well to figure out when the § 102(b) bar was triggered, and
the Court changed the verbal formulation a little bit. But there has
not been a huge distinction in outcomes since the Court decided
Pfaff. I fear to say I think that is what is going to happen here. I
can imagine the Court might tinker a little bit with Graham, but I
am not sure it will significantly advance thinking within our
obviousness jurisprudence.
At the end of the day, I believe we can still hold out hope for a
worthy successor to Graham v. John Deere—an opinion that both
70
71
72

Anderson’s-Black Rock v. Pavement Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
Sakraida v. Ag Pro Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
Pfaff v. Wells Elecs. Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998).
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thoughtfully discusses the obviousness requirement and addresses
the very apparent problems of the modern patent system.
I will cede almost ninety seconds to the panel. I thank you for
listening. Thank you.
MR. RICHARDS: One of the problems we have, of course, is
that obviousness is in reality a very nebulous concept. When I was
starting out in England a million years ago, there was a thing called
the Cripps question,73 which was trotted out by the courts all the
time as being the test for obviousness. When you analyze it, it
really came down to saying “it’s obvious if it’s obvious.” We have
had these problems in dealing with it to this day.
Now, Jay, I think, wants to put the emphasis much more firmly
on determining how inventive the skilled person should be in order
to apply this. That is, I think, an interesting approach. However,
how are you going to determine what the skill level should be in
any particular situation?
PROFESSOR THOMAS: So the question I received is, how do
we determine the level of ordinary skill in the art? Well, that is
what we are doing right now. So I think we’ve got at least
experience since the 1960s about how we ought to identify that.
Right now, parties primarily do it by stipulation, because it
doesn’t matter. That is the effective result, because it does not
contribute to the obviousness analysis in any way. It is simply a
placeholder that lets the court move on.
I think what we need to do is look to the level of active practice
in the field, look to people who are working on the category of
technology that is involved in the case, and consider what that
average artisan might be. So it is as simple as that.
MR. LEE: As a practitioner, my experience is that the parties
do not stipulate to what the level of ordinary skill is. Then, what
they do is, of course, everybody will have their own set of experts.
One side will have a medicinal chemist and the other will have a
pharmaceutical chemist, and they will fight over what is the person
of ordinary skill in the art. The judge will then decide to accept
73
See Sharpe & Dohme Inc. v. Boots Pure Drug Co., [1927] 45 R.P.C. 153, 173, 176
(C.A. 1927).
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one of these on the basis of which side he or she likes, and then
will say that the other expert is really not qualified in this area
because he is not even one of ordinary skill in the art. So that is
what I am seeing lately, is that the level of ordinary skill in the art
is being used, although maybe not in the way that you are talking
about.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I will just add one other comment to that. I
have difficulty as a trial lawyer as to how to do it the way John
would like. In theory it is interesting, but my experience is either
the parties stipulate or the experts are diverse, like Steve says. But
in no case that I have been in has anybody actually tried to put in
as a matter of evidence what a person of ordinary skill knew or
didn’t know. It is a very difficult thing. With a good judge in a
jury trial, you would have a difficult time getting it in, first of all.
And, second of all, the court would become very impatient with it.
If you wanted to list out fifteen characteristics or things that an
expert would know to do it, the other side would try to take those
apart. It becomes a very difficult issue in terms of trial.
As a matter of theory I like it, and I agree that I think it ought
to be more robust, but I am not quite so sure how it ought to get
done.
PROFESSOR THOMAS: Do you like it because it comports
with the wording in § 103?74
MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes.
PROFESSOR THOMAS: Okay. I think that is another big
advantage.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I like it because I think it clearly comes out
of § 103.75 The problem to me is more one of the practicality, of
exactly how you use it and develop it in the courtroom.
MR. RICHARDS: It is a matter of what they know or how they
think?
MR. SCHWARTZ: It is a matter of if you are going to decide
that a chemist has a certain skill-set that would bear on the
invention, you’ve got to have some basis to put it in other than
74
75

35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
Id.
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pure speculation of “well, do you know how to mix these types of
chemicals and do you know how to do that?” “Yup, yup, yup.” It
has got to be more robust than that, and then it gets into evidentiary
issues. I would not say it is impossible. It is complicated.
MR. RICHARDS: Jay, any thoughts on how you would
actually realize this practically?
PROFESSOR THOMAS: Well, I am not so sure it is as bad as
it is being portrayed. Again, there certainly are cases where we
have talked about the person of ordinary skill in the art. It is a
fixture of current law. I just think it is an underdeveloped fixture,
because the Federal Circuit shows a more rigorous rule that is
ultimately more lenient.
MR. LEE: I was going to say I think that it can be done. I have
seen it recently in the guise of the enablement requirement,76
because you are trying to find out whether something could be
made without undue experimentation; and then you go through and
try to establish what people did in actuality, what people could
have done, and how difficult the experimentation would be. It
would seem to me that the level of ordinary skill in the art would
be a similar kind of a factual undertaking. If it was called for, if
the courts wanted it, I think that the parties could do it.
MR. RICHARDS: But in prosecution of an application?
MR. LEE: Well, you know, the Patent Office does not pay
much attention really to the Federal Circuit, or the Supreme Court
for that matter. I find that the Patent Office has its own body of
precedent. It has its Manual of Patent Examining Procedure.77 I
am not trying to disparage the Patent Office here, but I think that
the Patent Office, even less than the Federal Circuit, pays attention
to what somebody has characterized as these verbal formulations
of what the test is.
PROFESSOR THOMAS: I agree with Mr. Lee on that point,
simply because this is an office that is going to hire a thousand
examiners a year for the next five years. It has run out of space in
76

35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (8th ed.,
rev. 5 2006).
77
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its marble palace of Carlyle and is going to start detailing its most
experienced people to work at home, which means all the new
people won’t be able to go down the hall and ask someone how to
perform examination tasks.78 So I think we have to have a realistic
sense of the trickle-down effect of anything the Supreme Court
says to actual day-to-day life in patent prosecution.
But nonetheless, it is not such a bad thing. I mean, plainly, the
patents that are litigated tend to be the more important patents, and
the patents that are licensed will be subject to determinations in
view of the case law. So I agree. I am also a little jaundiced about
that distinction. But I still think there is a possibility for good with
the KSR case.
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you.
Anybody else on the panel want to comment on what anybody
else has said before we throw it open to the floor?
MR. LEE: I would just like to say that, whatever the right level
of obviousness is in the United States, in some cases we definitely
are doing better than the rest of the world. For example, an
egregious example, even recognized by the U.K. courts, when they
found that the patent on Viagra was obvious, the judges said, it was
a remarkable invention, but we are constrained by our body of law
to find that this would have been an obvious invention.79 It
certainly did not seem that way to the world. I would say that a
system which finds that that patent was obvious is a system which
is broken and needs to be fixed. While I think the corresponding
patent in the United States has not really been challenged, I think
that we would have a better opportunity under our law to find that
that patent was not obvious.
MR. RICHARDS: I am certainly not going to try to defend the
current application of the standard in the United Kingdom. It is
becoming a very anti-patent jurisdiction, as far as I can make out at
the moment.

78

Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Launches Telecommuting
Program for Patent Examiners (July 2, 2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/com/speeches/01-29.htm.
79
See Pfizer Ltd.’s Patent, [2001] F.S.R. 16 (Ch. (Pats. Ct.) 2000) (Eng.).
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Anybody in the audience have any thoughts or questions they
want to ask? Say who you are for the Journal.
QUESTION: James Power. I am a patent attorney practicing
in the neighborhood here.
I would like to direct this question to Professor Thomas, and
anyone else who would like to jump in certainly is invited to do so.
It seems from reading your amicus brief that what your group
wishes to do is to de-emphasize or take away some of the
pragmatic grounds by which the courts test the obviousness
standard. In other words, the person of ordinary skill in the art can
say, “I think it is obvious,” but he then has to present “why do I
think it is obvious; what is it that suggests the obviousness?” and
then to re-emphasize the person of ordinary skill in the art’s
opinion.
My question would be: When the person of ordinary skill in the
art gets on the stand and testifies “I think this patent is obvious,
Judge; may I now step down?” how do you cross-examine him, if
you cannot ask him what his reasons or bases are or what led him
to that opinion?
PROFESSOR THOMAS: Well, in response to that―it is a
great question, but my response is what I think our group of
academics is opposed to is the “teaching, suggestion, motivation”
requirement. We are not opposed to that being relevant, we are not
opposed to that being the epitome of obviousness, but we think that
that blunt approach, which boils down to you have to have prior-art
journal articles describing each and every step of the claimed
invention and how to put them together, simply means that there
are too many errors of patents being granted that should not be,
because there are other sources of knowledge that will not
necessarily be before that tribunal and there are, again, artisanal
skills that simply cannot be accounted for.
So certainly, in terms of the finding of fact of ordinary skill,
these will be questions that will be left to the trier of facts, as so
many other similar style questions are―what is a reasonable
person; how does a reasonable person behave? You cannot tell me
that in tort cases that you have to have a journal article proving
how a reasonable person would behave when she crosses the street.

PANEL_I_FINAL_050807

904

5/8/2007 12:57:03 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

Vol. 17:875

I think, similarly, the level of proof has been so elevated, it is
basically impossible for the Patent Office to reject an application.
As you know, right now the U.S. Patent Office claims a
roughly seventy percent grant rate.80 But, in fact, that is an Enronstyle accounting statistic, because what that really counts is the
number of final rejections that come out every year. Now, of
course, thirty percent of those rejected will be re-filed the next year
under the continuation strategy.81 So the actual corrected grant
rate we do not really know, because the Patent Office will not
count them, but it is probably on the order of ninety-five percent.
In fact, someone did a study of the first one hundred published
applications after the 1999 amendments, and something like
ninety-two of them had become issued patents, which was a little
embarrassing.82
It was funny, because during this era I was prosecuting myself,
and I thought, “Boy, I am really good at this. What a fine young
patent attorney I am.” Then I found out everybody was doing it.
I do think there is a connection there, and I think that by itself,
that we are so out of step with our peers, suggests that in fact we
are being overly lenient and creating an overly porous Patent
Office. I think the obvious requirement has a lot to do with it.
Sorry for that longwinded answer.
MR. LEE: I thought one of the points in your amicus brief was
that the solution is not to decide whether patents are valid or
invalid at the stage of a district court litigation―it is much too late;
it is much too expensive. People need to have more certainty in
whether they have a property which is valid and can be enforced.
So I do agree. I think we both agree that what really has to be
done is to get rid of these bad patents at an early stage.

80

See, e.g., Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications
and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office—Updated, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 635 (2006).
81
Id.
82
Dennis Crouch, Statistical Interlude: First 100 Published Applications, PATENTLY-O,
Aug. 23, 2006, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/08/interesting_sid.html.

PANEL_I_FINAL_050807

2007

5/8/2007 12:57:03 PM

KSR v. TELEFLEX: NONOBVIOUSNESS IN PATENT

905

There is in the Patent Reform Act of 2005 and 2006,83 and
probably in a couple months 2007, a provision for oppositions to
granted patents, where people can come in and oppose them,
having a lower burden of proof―preponderance of the evidence,
no presumption of validity.84 But even under these opposition
proceedings, they are limited in certain ways, in terms of time and
in terms of the effect on later litigation. But that is one way in
which I suppose that we could try to avoid patent litigation in the
first place and try to get the patents out valid and earlier.
MR. RICHARDS: Other questions?
QUESTION: John Richardson from New York City.
I was going to get into what you were talking about, Mr. Lee. I
just wanted to reinforce what you said. Anybody who knows
anything about patent prosecution or has seen people writing
applications knows that formal novelty is very often quite easy to
achieve. I have seen so many cases where you are talking about
adding factors―it could be weight, it could be thickness, it could
be purity, all these sort of things. It is very, very easy for a skilled
person to do this. So obviousness really carries everything.
If the Patent Office is just looking at patent documents, printed
publications, they are not going to get a flavor for the skill in the
art. These documents are written by lawyers. So there has got to
be some way of dealing with that at the Patent Office level.
Otherwise, patent law is simply a wasteland, it is not respectable, it
is a laughingstock. I just hope that we do not just get a solution
that only applies to litigation at the district court or the CAFC
level. It has got to be at the Patent Office.
QUESTION: Mark Felcomy [phonetic].
Professor, you talked before about the need to balance the two
types of errors. You talked about granting too many patents,
granting too few. My question is: Isn’t that balance ultimately a
83
Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:H.R.2795:/; Patent Reform Act of 2006,
S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:
S.3818:/.
84
See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 332 (2005); Patent
Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 316 (2006).
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matter of social policy? And might the right answer to that
question actually change, not only with geography, but change
over time the balance between society’s interest in rewarding
innovation, on the one hand, versus the benefits of competition in
the marketplace, on the other hand? Isn’t that a question which is
really less a matter of law and more a matter of social policy that
perhaps the courts should have the flexibility to address as the
needs of the society change over time?
PROFESSOR THOMAS: Yes. Actually, I agree with you. If I
misspoke or mis-styled my comments―I just believe that right
now our balance is so out of whack that we need to restore it.
Plainly, presumptions and burdens of proof―don’t mock the
IBM brief that much.85 The Supreme Court likes presumptions in
patent law, and we might have another presumption here.
But, obviously, you have to overcome the burden of proof of
validity by clear and convincing evidence. So that is a way of
saying, “Well, we would prefer to make an error that this is
unpatentable, but we are going to grant the patent. We would
prefer to make that error than the other way around.”
But right now, again, with a grant rate that is certainly above
ninety percent, I think we are well above that standard and into a
land of sophistry and fiction. I am not sure I am going to call it the
wasteland, but I am getting there. You could talk me into it, John.
I agree with your remarks, but again I hope that we can ratchet
down the ability to get a patent at this point.
MR. SCHWARTZ: Yes, I would agree with it too. To me, the
most startling thing about all the briefs in KSR is they are all on
one side or the other.86 There is really nobody trying to pick a
middle ground that is good for the system or society, which is what
you are talking about. They are all interest groups one way or the
other. Maybe that is the adversary system and what have you, but
to me it is startlingly biased both ways, and to me ultimately
unhelpful to the Court in that way. So I think that the Court is
85

IBM Brief, supra note 52.
See, e.g., Solicitor General’s Brief, supra note 48 (supporting the petitioner, KSR);
Law & Business Professors’ Brief, supra note 53 (supporting the respondent, Teleflex).
86
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going to have to pick their own middle ground. I guess that is
what I am suggesting.
MR. RICHARDS: And your other thoughts on what that
middle ground might be?
MR. SCHWARTZ: I think it is what I said earlier. I think the
Court is going to go back to the statute87 and Graham.88 Possibly
leave suggestion as one of the alternatives to think about and
consider along the way, but take it back to the basics and let the
Court re-develop it according to what they said thirty or forty years
ago.
QUESTION: My name is Richard Field.
Although it is interest groups on the briefs, it struck me that it
was the IT industry in large part, the Internet industry, that seems
to be objecting to the existing test. That seems instructive. They
are jumping up in down, in large part saying, “This is not working
for us. What is different?”
The panel has not really focused in on the group that is saying
“this test doesn’t work.” Is there something unique to that
industry? Is it because the industry has developed within the
course of two years? There is no written teaching out there.
People are leaping in. Maybe the first guy who applied “business
methods in the Internet” was a genius, but the second or the
thirtieth guy might not have been. But there is no prior written
material. Is there something different about IT and the Internet
that would suggest that this test is not working for that group?
MR. SCHWARTZ: The thing that is different is how much
more patents are enforceable in this day and age and how much
more valuable they are. Forty years ago, it was not a problem
because not that many patents got sustained, injunctive relief was
not that easily available. Right now, it becomes too much of a
burden on industries where there are tons of patents. That is the IT
industry.
I agree with Steve, Pharma is very different. Pharma is a few
patents and they are crucial to getting the product on the market or
87
88

35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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not. I think the Supreme Court has addressed that already in the
injunctive relief case.89 And the courts are already addressing it
and they are changing previous doctrine. Now they are staying
injunctions on appeal. There is really a cutting back of the strength
of the system, which is really, I think, in response to the IT
industry, which says, “We can’t pay $100 million for every dippy
patent that comes along. We need something more sensible.”
MR. LEE: I tried to address this before, and obviously I didn’t.
In the IT industry, I think the barrier to drafting and getting a
patent application is very low in terms of money, as opposed to in
the pharmaceutical industry where you’ve actually probably got to
do a decent number of experiments because this is a rather
unpredictable art.
So what you wind up having is lots of patents that are owned
by people who do not make products, they just license their
patents. This does not fit very well into a model of an industry
where everybody tends to cross-license each other, for instance in
computers or electrical engineering, and I think the Internet as
well. So what you wind up having is people having no down-side,
asserting their patents with only an up-side. If they get a favorable
district court decision, then the chances of a permanent injunction
pending appeal are quite high. This can lead to an imbalance in the
ability to negotiate a proper license in the area. This is what that
industry, I believe, is so afraid of and why they are trying to allow
challenges to patents to be easier than they are today.
MR. RICHARDS: So we are back to patent trolls.
MR. LEE: I did not use the word “trolls,” but yes, that is what
it is.
MR. RICHARDS: Any other questions or comments from the
floor?
QUESTION: My name is Ted Weitz. I am not a patent lawyer,
but I have been practicing in the technology industry for many years.
One comment on the last item, which is, I think, another
motivation for the IT industry is the fact that those who grew up in
the IT industry recognize that, unlike pharmaceuticals where
89

eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
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people actually made the tradeoff and understood that their
investment in research and development was in part because they
would get a monopoly for a period of time and be able to recover
the cost, virtually no one in IT thought in those terms as they were
developing things, and they have not found patents a proper
stimulus to innovation, but rather have found patents almost
exclusively an obstacle to innovation. I think that, in part,
motivates it.
But I also had a question. The question was on the skill-in-theart discussion that we had a little earlier. Once upon a time, you
could figure out that in horseshoes a farrier was a good person who
was of ordinary skill in the art and ask would it be obvious to that
individual. That is all well and good. But when you are dealing
with more complex areas―if you are talking about nuclear fuel,
somebody who is of ordinary skill in the art is probably at least a
Ph.D. with some post-doctoral work, because nobody else is in that
art really. Is there any learning on what you consider “ordinary” in
terms of trying to develop a standard of ordinary skill in the art?
MR. SCHWARTZ: That is really one of my problems, which is
why I raised it. You get yourself into a narrow corner and a very
high level and the problems of proof of whether that nuclear
scientist knew A, B, C, D, E. What you are going to end up with a
lot of times is what Steve said, I think. You are going to get
experts on either side, depending on what side of the lawsuit they
are on, having very stark and different views of what the expert
would know or would not know. I do not know how far that really
gets you. That is one way.
Then, the other way is people just punt on it and they stipulate
that the person of ordinary skill in the art has a Ph.D. in nuclear
engineering, and then people go on to something else. So nobody
has any idea what that means.
MR. LEE: To be completely accurate, to match the statute to
the facts, you would have to replace “a person of ordinary skill in
the art” with “a team of ordinary skill in the art,” because so many
inventions in the pharmaceutical area, for example, are made by a
team of people. No one person has all these skills and abilities.
There is no such person, even hypothetically.
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MR. RICHARDS: One of the problems is with “ordinary skill
in the art,” not “ordinary knowledge in the art.” When does the
skill merge into knowledge? That is my big problem on this.
Jay, you raised it.
PROFESSOR THOMAS: I will weigh in again and try to not
add to my own misery with your views on the skill-in-the-art
approach. As Steve previously said, we have the enablement
inquiry90 and we have claim construction.91 The person of skill in
the art is waiting in the wings. He is there. He is not going away.
He has been part of the Graham inquiry for a long time. In fact,
there is debate.
I am familiar with at least one European Patent Office
Technical Board decision in which one of the parties actually
prooposed a Nobel Laureate as the person of ordinary skill.92
Now, the Board actually went with a slightly lower level.
And, confounded, it would be such a difficult task to determine
who would be leading a research team, what is the average
competence of people who are active in the area. Certainly, in the
bar associations we do that all the time―what is the average level
of skill of a managing partner at a firm?
It just escapes me to some degree. But I will certainly defer to
my senior colleagues. It escapes me that skillful lawyers in highprofile cases, with lots of will and lots of resources, will not be
able to frame the discussion in a way that the Court will be able to
come up with the level of ordinary skill, as the Supreme Court has
instructed us since the 1960s.
MR. RICHARDS: This is not the place to go down the road as
to whether we should have expanded patentable subject matter to
90
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same. . . .”).
91
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Claim
construction produces “the meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in
the art . . . .”).
92
Case T 0060/89, Harvard Univ. v. Hoechst, 1992 O.J. E.P.O. 268 (Technical Bd. of
Appeal 1990), available at http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/t890060
ep1.htm.
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include computer software, but obviously that is something of an
issue in the background of some of this.
Anybody else have any other questions, comments?
QUESTION: Hugh Hansen, Fordham Law School.
One thing is it seems like the patent community is sort of
sealed into itself and almost impervious to criticism from outside,
and it has been allowed for a long time basically to exist and just
run its own show. The Supreme Court did not grant cert for a case
from the Federal Circuit for something like fifteen years. Now the
Supreme Court seems to be thinking, “Okay, not you guys, but
somehow something is going wrong in a number of things and
non-experts have to look at this.”
European patent people seem to have a lot of criticism of what
is going on in the United States. People within the system, like
Dan Ravicher, are going crazy over what is going on. To what
extent does it matter to the patent bar and what is going to happen?
To what extent, no matter what the Supreme Court does, will the
Federal Circuit and the PTO and all just continue in a form of
basically doing what they want to do? Or is there sensitivity to
non-expert, non-patent people, non-technical people, and what they
think?
MR. SCHWARTZ: I think there is. I think the response to the
injunctive decision93 of a year ago is an example of that. The
Federal Circuit recently stayed an injunction in the TiVo case94
against competitors that three years ago they would have never
been stayed, in my opinion, absolutely would not have happened,
and they did it in a very brief opinion.
I think the Federal Circuit is very much aware of what the
Supreme Court is doing, and I think it is going to adopt its ways to
what comes down in KSR. I think it is a good thing that there are
others out there looking at it who are not patent people. For people
who have had problems with the Federal Circuit, one issue is its
parochialism and the fact that it does not have any outside
93

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
Public Order at 1, TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., No. 2006-1574, (Fed.
Cir. Aug. 18, 2006), available at http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/TiVo_20Granting_
20Stay.pdf.
94
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influences. It is now getting it from the Supreme Court because
you do not have coordinate appellate courts like you used to.
PROFESSOR THOMAS: I agree with Mr. Schwartz. I think
things can change. Let me say that, even before the Federal
Circuit, it was hard to get a patent sustained; but often, when you
did, you would have a robust scope of equivalency. You no longer
have a robust scope of equivalency at the Federal Circuit.95 That
has changed.
Certainly, the fact that the Federal Circuit is writing a lot of
opinions responsive to the amici suggests that it is not blowing this
off, it is taking this very seriously. The fact that other federal
government agencies, like the FTC96 and the Solicitor General,97
are getting interested in the patent system suggests that the entire
field is under more scrutiny. So I think it may be slow to change,
and I am often frustrated by the slow pace of change myself, but I
think there will be change, there has to be change.
MR. SCHWARZ: I think it is inevitable.
MR. LEE: Where the public could get into the picture is in the
debate over the Patent Reform Act.98 Unfortunately, what I see is
that everybody who seems interested in this seems to be a specialinterest group, somebody that is interested in getting patents. All
the people that are involved and have been supporting this issue
have been submitting papers and speaking are all part of industries
which are heavily involved in patents. There does not seem to be
any representative of the public saying, “What are we giving up for
these monopolies? What are we getting in exchange for giving

95

See John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771
(2003).
96
FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
97
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., No. 041350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2005/2pet/
6invit/2004-1350.pet.ami.inv.pdf.
98
Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006), available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.3818:/; Amendment in the Nature of a
Substitute to H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2006), available at http://www.ipo.org/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=3350.
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So I am

MR. RICHARDS: Any thoughts from anybody in the audience
on Professor Hansen’s comments?
QUESTION: Greg Maskel of the Fordham IPLJ.
Mr. Lee just mentioned the role of Congress. This panel has
discussed the Supreme Court and how it might act as a check on
the Federal Circuit’s view of obviousness. But what do you think
is Congress’ role, or does Congress have any interest in wading
into this dispute?
PROFESSOR THOMAS: First, I have to apologize. I am
going to have to run out after listening to my other colleagues’ and
my questions. So I want to thank you now.
I work on Capitol Hill one day a week. I go over to the
Congressional Research Service and answer queries from members
of Congress and their staff about the patent law. I have seen the
1999 Act99 and now the reform acts.100 Congress has a very active
role at this point. I think they have put a lot of time and effort into
learning about the patent system, and I think they do not want to
see that effort go to waste. So they are going to pass something.
That is what Congress does, it passes laws.
Now, what the shape of that law will be, or whether it will be
the omnibus reform that we have seen, that is an open question. I
think right now we are still shaking out who the chairman of the
House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property is going to be. That person will have great influence on
what happens. So if we get someone who is more in the
independent inventor lobby, or someone who is more interested in
corporations in her district, then that is going to be what the bill is
99

American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A552 (1999). For more information on the AIPA, see U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/
olia/aipa/.
100
Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006) available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.3818:/; Amendment in the Nature of a
Substitute to H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://www.ipo.org/AM/
Template.cfm?Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=3350.
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going to look like. So I think you can substantially predict by that
one person.
Now, when eBay101 came out, Congress moved away from
injunctions. There has not been any talk about nonobviousness. I
do not think in the § 103 area,102 the nonobviousness area,
Congress is that interested in legislating. The last time they tried
to do it was in response to business methods, when they were
going to have a special obviousness standard for business methods
and software patents, but that bill when dropped was dead on
arrival.103 I think that Congress actually finds that obviousness is
not something that is that conducive for it to legislate upon.
MR. SCHWARTZ: I agree with what Jay said. He is certainly
more knowledgeable than I am on what goes on in Congress day to
day. I have had my experiences with them over time, also advising
them. I think they will do something. I agree that it is going to
turn a lot on who the two chairmen are.
MR. LEE: In the current statute, there is a special provision on
obviousness for biotech inventions,104 but in the proposals for the
patent reform acts that has actually been dropped. So, if anything,
it would seem to me that they are going back to a simpler view of
obviousness.
MR. THOMAS: That is a good point.
MR. RICHARDS: Thank you, Jay. We greatly appreciate your
being with us this morning.
Has anybody else got any thoughts, comments, or should we
break for coffee? There is a motion for coffee. Seeing nobody
objecting, the motion passes.
Thank you all for being here. Thank you especially to Steve
and to Herb and to Jay, and thank you all for your invaluable
contributions.
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